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ARRESTS, DETENTIONS, AND CONFESSION ADMISSIBILITY

Evidence-Constitutional law-Effect of delay in
arraignment in admissibility of confessions, Texas
Law Review, 35: 728, May 1957.
McNabb rules: Upshaw through Mallory, Virginia Law
Review, 43: 915. October 1952.
Leyra case. Criminal Law Review. Volume 4, page 83.
Spring 1957.
McNabb rule: Upshaw through Mallory. Virginia
Law Review. Volume 43, page 915. October 1957.
Under the McNabb rule a confession can be excluded
from evidence because of an illegal detention only if
shown to be the product of that illegal detention
(Rettig v. United States, 239 F. 2d 916), Georgetown
Law Journal, 45: 504. Spring 1957.

Restrictions in the law of interrogation and confessions.
Northwestern University Law Review. Volume 52,
page 77. March-April 1957.
Right of an accused to obtain pretrial inspection of his
confession. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology
and Police Science. Volume 48, page 305. SeptemberOctober 1957.
Safeguards in the law of interrogation and confessions.
Northwestern University Law Review. Volume 52,
page 86. March-April 1957.
Utah court holds evidence independent of extrajudicial
confession insufficient to establish corpus delicti.
Utah Law Review. Volume 5, page 549. Fall 1957.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES*
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Out-ofState Witnesses is Valid-The states of New
York and Florida had enacted similar statutes,
known generally as "the "Uniform Law to Secure
the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings." A
request was made under the Florida statute by
New York authorities to have the respondent
delivered into their custody to be transported to
New York to testify before a grand jury proceeding. This request was refused by the Florida courts
on the ground that the statute violated the United
States Constitution. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that the
statute did not violate the privileges and immunities clause, nor the due process clause, of the 14th
Amendment. New York v. O'Neill, 79 Sup. Ct.
564 (1959).
The respondent claimed that the right to ingress and egress between the states is a privilege
of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the instant statute
violates this privilege. The Court rejected this
argument, saying that, even under the broadest
scope possible, this statute did not violate the
Constitution. Florida could have held the respondent within Florida if he had been a material
witness in a criminal proceeding within that state,
yet this would not have been less of a limitation
on his claim of the right of ingress and egress than
is an order to attend and testify in New York.
Thus, this statute does not violate the freedom of
travel in its essential sense, but is only a temporary
interference with voluntary travel, particularly
in this era of jet transportation.
The respondent argued further that, inasmuch
as what was to be ordered under the statute was
* Prepared by Francis A. Heroux, Senior Law
Student, Northwestern University School of Law.

to be carried on in a foreign jurisdiction, the
Florida courts could not constitutionally be given
jurisdiction to order it. The Court rejected this
because the Florida courts had immediate personal
jurisdiction over respondent by virtue of his
presence within that state, and this gave the
Florida courts constitutional jurisdiction to order
the doing of an act, even though that act is to be
performed outside of the state.
On a broader level, the Court noted the beneficial aspects of this statute, holding that it served
a self-protective function for each of the enacting
states, and was a catalyst of cohesion for the
federal union. Thus, the Court recognized that,
to strike down this statute would be an unwarranted constriction of state and national powers,
and would hobble the effective functioning of
federalism.
Two Justices dissented on the ground that the
statute violated the constitutional right of a citizen
to free ingress and egress between the states.
Newly discovered evidence of wrong identification of accomplice merits new trial-Upon the
uncorroborated testimony of a fifteen-year old
boy, defendant was convicted of second-degree
robbery. The boy testified that he had spent
twelve hours in an automobile with the defendant
and the driver (who was not apprehended).
The boy identified the driver as a tall, mustached
Indian with whom he had been previously acquainted. The defendant was also identified as
the person who assaulted the boy and took $2
from his person. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
reversed and remanded on the ground of newly
discovered evidence that the boy was completely
wrong in his identification of the driver and that
the prosecution was aware of this evidence before
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the trial. State v. Warren, 89 N.W. 2d 702 (Minn.
1958).
The court reasoned that if the jury knew that
the prosecuting witness was completely wrong in
his identification of the driver, they would not
have believed his testimony regarding the identity
of the defendant. The trial court was said to have
abused its discretion in denying a motion for a
new trial.
The dissenting justice insisted that while a new
trial might properly have been granted upon the
record, the denial of the motion did not involve a
"violation of a clear legal right or a manifest abuse
of judicial discretion."
Illinois Court Re-defines Crime of BurglaryFour men entered a warehouse and pushed a
safe belonging to the company out of the second
floor window into the yard below. The safe proved
too heavy to move, so the four men left for help.
The defendant, who had no prior knowledge of the
crime, was recruited to give his aid, but, upon
returning to the warehouse yard, the men were
arrested while in the act of lifting the safe into
their car.
The defendant was tried and convicted of the
crime of burglary, and he appealed, contending
that the evidence was insufficient to prove him
guilty of the crime charged. The Supreme Court

[Vol. 50

of Illinois reversed the conviction, holding that
proof that the defendant was guilty of assisting
burglars after they had removed a safe from a
building would not make the defendant a principal in the crime of burglary. Illinois v. Zierlion,
157 N.E. 2d 72 (M1. 1959).
The defendant argued that, to warrant a conviction for burglary, it must be shown that the
accused entered a building with intent to commit a
felony, and that, since the evidence failed to show
such conduct on the part of defendant, the instant conviction could not stand. The court
accepted this theory, noting that while the defendant may have been an accessory after the fact,
this was an independent offense and had no relevance to the crime of burglary.
The dissent charged the majority of the court
with erroneously assuming that the burglary had
been completed prior to defendant's participation
in efforts to remove the safe from the warehouse
premises. The dissent agreed that prior court decisions have held that a burglary is complete
upon the breaking and entering with intent to
steal, but it believed that this should not predude the crime from being a continuing one, as
long as the participants are still in the process of
committing larceny of the property.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science
Legal Abstracts and Notes," pp. 215-216).

